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REVIEW OF THE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS
ORDINANCE: CAN THE PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER REPLACE THE DIGITAL SIGNATURE?
E
K. H. Pun, Lucas Hui, K. P. Chow, W W Tsang,
C. F. Chong and H. W. Chan*
In a recent consultation document, the Information Technology and Broadcasting
Bureau proposed that personal identification numbers (PINs) be accepted as a form
of signature for the purposes of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance (ETO) (Cap
553). This article explains why this proposal is fundamentally flawed. The article
identifies three basic requirements for a signature and examines whether they are
satisfied by digital signatures and PINs. It concludes that while a digital signature
has built into it all the elements necessary for compliance with the requirements, a
PIN can only be used for the purpose of authorisation and cannot be elevated to the
status of a signature as required by the ETO.
Introduction
The Electronic Transactions Ordinance (ETO) (Cap 553) was enacted in Janu-
ary 2000 with a view to providing the legal infrastructure necessary for electronic
commerce in Hong Kong. Following the Model Law on Electronic Commerce'
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) in 1996, the main effect of the ETO is to give the same legal
recognition to electronic records and digital signatures as to their paper-based
counterparts. Now, two years after the ETO came into operation,2 the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government, based on its own
commitment to review the Ordinance 18 months after its enactment, is con-
ducting a public consultation on the ETO. The Government's view on the
Ordinance is expressed in its Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic
Transactions Ordinance' issued by the Information Technology and Broadcast-
ing Bureau (ITBB) in March 2002. In the consultation paper, the ITBB proposes
* The authors are teaching staff of the Department of Computer Science and members of the Center
for Information Security and Cryptography at the University of Hong Kong.
1 See http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm.htm.
2 The ETO has been in full operation since Apr 2000.
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that the ETO be amended to accept personal identification numbers (PINs) to
satisfy the signature requirement thereunder. The ITBB's argument is as follows:
"The use of PIN for authentication has been widely tested in various types
of market applications. With proper management, it can be considered for
acceptance as a form of electronic signatures for satisfying the signature
requirement under law in specified cases where the level of security of-
fered by it is commensurate with the risk of the service involved, eg where
there is already established relationship between the parties involved so
that the PIN could be securely issued, used and verified; and where a se-
cure system like the Electronic Service Delivery Scheme which provides
strong encryption services for data transmission is used for making the
electronic transaction ... We, therefore, consider that there is a case for
the ETO to be amended and a new schedule added so that the Secretary
for Information Technology and Broadcasting (the Secretary) may, by sub-
sidiary legislation, specify in the new schedule legal provisions under which
the use of PIN will be accepted for satisfying the signature requirement."'
The ITBB's argument is fundamentally flawed. Its proposal to accept PINs
as a form of signature reflects a misconception about the basic requirements
for a signature in general, and a lack of understanding of digital signature
technology in particular. If the proposal were implemented, it would consid-
erably damage the Government's endeavour to build a public key infrastructure
(PKI) in Hong Kong and its efforts to promote electronic commerce based on
such an infrastructure.
This article explains why, contrary to the ITBB's view, a PIN cannot serve
as a signature for the purposes of the ETO. To appreciate this, one must start
with the basic requirements for a signature and the principal features of the
relevant technologies. As the analysis will demonstrate, once these require-
ments and features are properly considered and understood, it is clear why a
PIN cannot serve as a signature under the ETO, whereas a digital signature
based on PKI can.
Basic Requirements for a Signature
Despite the importance of a signature for commercial documents, the basic
requirements for a signature are not expressly set out in legislation. However,
if the relevant ordinances and case law are examined, three observations about
the basic requirements can be made.
3 See http://www.info.gov.hk/itbb/english/paper/index-n.htm.
4 Ibid., para 8.
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First, the term "signature" is defined in the ETO to "include any symbol
executed or adopted, or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted,
by a person with the intention of authenticating or approving a record".'
From this definition one immediately notes a basic requirement for a signature:
namely, that it must indicate the signatory's approval of the document signed.
Second, although "signature" is not defined in any other ordinance, its
meaning has been considered by the English courts in the context of various
English statutes. In Goodman v Eban,6 decided by the English Court of Appeal,
Romer LJ approved a definition in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary7 that "speaking
generally a signature is the writing, or otherwise affixing, [of] a person's name,
or a mark to represent his name, by himself or by his authority with the inten-
tion of authenticating a document as being that of, or as binding on, the
person whose name or mark is so written or affixed".' This statement lays
down another basic requirement for a signature, that it must represent the
signatory so that the signed document carries the authority of the signatory.
Third, implicit in the statutory definition and case law mentioned above
is a further requirement that a signature must not be forged or obtained by
fraud, or else it is null and void. For bills of exchange, this requirement is
implied in the Bills of Exchange Ordinance (Cap 19), which provides that
"where a signature on a bill is forged or placed thereon without the authority
of the person whose signature it purports to be, the forged or unauthorised
signature is wholly inoperative".9
From these observations one can derive three basic requirements for a
signature, whether the signature is handwritten or in digital form:
1 The signature must identify the signatory so that the document has the
requisite authority of the signatory. This can be termed the
"authorisation requirement".
2 The signature must indicate that the signatory has approved the con-
tents contained in the document in their entirety. This can be termed
the "approval requirement".
3 The signature must not be the product of any fraud, ie the signature
must indeed be that of the signatory and must be applied by the
signatory, or with his authority, to the document. This can be termed
the "no fraud requirement".
These requirements will collectively be referred to as "the three
requirements". They are consistent with the signature requirement suggested
5 Section 2(1.
6 [1954] 1 QB 550 (CA).
7 3rd edn.
8 Note 6 above, p 563.
9 Section 24.
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by UNCITRAL in the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, from which
the ETO and laws on electronic commerce in many other jurisdictions
are derived."The signature requirement is set out in the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce in the following terms:
"Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met
in relation to a data message if:
(a) a method is used to identify that person and to indicate that person's
approval of the information contained in the data message; and
(b) that method is reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which
the data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all
the circumstances, including any relevant agreement.""
Although the requirement is phrased in the context of a "data message", it
is clear that condition (a) therein corresponds to the authorisation require-
ment and the approval requirement, and that condition (b) contains the
concept of the no fraud requirement. Indeed, the three requirements match
even more closely the signature requirement under a more recent model law
adopted by UNCITRAL, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures of Decem-
ber 2001.12 Pursuant to this model law, an electronic signature meets the
legal requirement for a signature if it is "as reliable as was appropriate for the
purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated, in the
light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement"." An elec-
tronic signature is considered to be reliable in this context if the following
requirements are met:
"(a) the signature creation data are, within the context in which they are
used, linked to the signatory and to no other person;
(b) the signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the
control of the signatory and of no other person;
(c) any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of
signing, is detectable; and
(d) where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide
assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates,
any alteration made to that information after the time of signing is
detectable."'"
10 See for example the United Kingdom Electronic Communications Act 2000; the Australian Elec-
tronic Transactions Act 1999; and the Singaporean Electronic Transactions Act (Cap 88).
1' Art 7(1).
12 See www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-elecsig-e.pdf.
1 Art 6(1).
14 Art 6(3).
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The similarity between these requirements and the three requirements is
obvious: namely, requirement (a) corresponds to the authorisation
requirement, requirement (d) corresponds to the approval requirement, and
requirements (b) and (c) to the no fraud requirement.
Similarly, the three requirements are also consistent with the requirements
for an "advanced electronic signature" under the European Union Directive
on electronic signatures." Under the Directive, such a signature is accorded
the same legal status as a handwritten signature, 6 but it has to meet the
following requirements as embedded in its definition:
"'advanced electronic signature' means an electronic signature which meets
the following requirements:
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his
sole control; and
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any
subsequent change of the data is detectable.""
Again, it is easy to see that requirements (a) and (b) in the definition
correspond to the authorisation requirement, that requirement (d) corresponds
to the approval requirement, and that requirement (c) is related to the no
fraud requirement.
While the three requirements are closely related (particularly the
authorisation requirement and the no fraud requirement) they remain separate.
A simple example suffices to illustrate this point. A document satisfies the
authorisation requirement by carrying a person's usual signature. Yet this does
not imply that it also satisfies the no fraud requirement, as the signature may
have been forged, or may have been obtained from the person on a separate
occasion and attached to the document without consent. Nor does it imply
that the document satisfies the approval requirement, as it may have been
altered after the person has signed it.
In situations where a document is signed in the presence of all interested
parties, the three requirements are normally satisfied without the need for
further considerations. This is because each interested party is able to ascer-
tain the true identity of the signatory and ensure that the document is properly
signed. Moreover, it is usual practice in such circumstances for each inter-
ested party to be given a copy of the signed document, which serves as a
15 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Dec 1999 on a Commu-
nity Framework for Electronic Signatures: [2000 Official Journal L13/12.
16 Art 5(1).
'7 Art 2(2).
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safeguard against any alteration of the document by any party in the event of
a dispute.
It is when a document is signed (or purported to be signed) in the absence
of other interested parties that problems may arise. As the interested parties
do not witness the signing of the document, they can only rely on the signed
document itself to ascertain whether the document was indeed signed by the
signatory free from fraud, and whether the signatory has approved of all the
contents of the document. In short, the interested parties can only ascertain
from the signed document alone whether all of the three requirements have
been met.
Signatures on Paper Documents
Whether or not one is aware of it, many well-established methods for check-
ing the "authenticity" of signatures on paper documents are in fact designed
to ascertain if the signatures have met the three requirements. To illustrate
this, some of the methods most often used in the conventional paper-based
world are set out below.
Ascertaining Authorisation
To determine whether a signed paper document has met the authorisation
requirement, the recipient of the document can check if there is external
information which confirms that the signature represents the signatory. Most
commonly, such external information is a record of the signatory's usual
signature. If such a record is available, the recipient can compare the signa-
ture on the document with the one on the record. Where the two are
substantially the same, the recipient can take the document as having the
signatory's authority. This is the standard practice of banks in accepting and
clearing signed cheques.
If the recipient has no record of the signatory's usual signature, as in the
case of a first-time dealing with the signatory, the recipient can ask the signa-
tory to sign the document in the presence of a trusted third party, such as a
solicitor or a public notary. The third party is requested to verify the signatory's
identity and also sign on the document to confirm that it has been properly
signed by the signatory. Relying on such confirmation, the recipient can ac-
cept the signed document as having the requisite authority of the signatory.
Ascertaining Approval
To determine whether a signed paper document has met the approval
requirement, the recipient can check if amendments have been made to the
document, and, if so, verify that each amendment has the signatory's signa-
ture adjacent to it. Such signatures are explicit indications of the signatory's
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approval of the amendments. If there is a signature missing, the recipient can
reject the document on the ground that it has not been approved by the
signatory in its entirety. Similarly, if a document is particularly important
and consists of more than one page, the recipient can ask the signatory to
sign on every page of the document and can reject the document if there is
any page unsigned.
It is important to note the significance of having the signatory's signature
adjacent to each amendment (or on every page) of the document. Such signa-
tures serve to "freeze" the contents of the document at the time the signature was
made and render any amendments (or pages) that are subsequently included with-
out authority (ie all those without the signatory's signature) immediately apparent to
the recipient. This ability on the part of the signatory to freeze a document is
required to comply with the approval requirement. Without this ability on
the part of the signatory, the recipient may never be able to tell whether the
document she receives has been tampered with after it was signed.
Ascertaining No Fraud
To determine whether a signed paper document has met the no fraud
requirement, the recipient can perform a variety of tests. These include: check-
ing the pen strokes and special features of the signature to see if they are
consistent with those of the signatory's usual signature; inspecting the paper
to see if any deletion of or alteration to the signature has been made; and
examining the position of the signature to see if it may have been taken from
another document and attached to the document in question (as where the
signature merely appears on an otherwise blank page at the end of a document).
These methods have often been used in probate disputes concerning the au-
thenticity of wills.
Generally, the most effective safeguard against fraud lies in having a so-
phisticated signature - the more sophisticated it is, the more difficult it is to
forge. Ideally, the signature should be such that even those who have a record
of it are unlikely to be able to forge it.
Alternatively, the recipient can adopt a similar arrangement as that for
the authorisation requirement discussed above, by asking the signatory to
sign the document in the presence of a trusted third party. The third party is
requested to verify the identity of the signatory, to ensure that the document
is properly signed, and to sign on the document as a witness thereto. If the
document is executed in accordance with this arrangement, the recipient can
accept it as being free from fraud.
Conditions for Compliance
From the above discussion, one can see the conditions for complying with
the three requirements. Although the discussion focuses on signatures on paper
Vol 32 Part 2
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documents, the conditions apply equally to signatures on any kind of
documents. It is thus worth summarising them:
1 to comply with the authorisation requirement, there must be informa-
tion available to the recipient of the signed document to confirm that
the signature represents the signatory;
2 to comply with the approval requirement, the signatory must have the
ability to "freeze" the contents of the document at the time it is signed; and
3 to comply with the no fraud requirement, the signature must be made
as sophisticated as is practicable so that even those who have a record
of the signature are unlikely to be able to forge it.
Electronic Documents
Unlike paper documents, electronic documents are made up of sequences of
bits" and reside on digital media. As such, there are two characteristics of
electronic documents that make them fundamentally different from paper
documents.
First, electronic documents can be copied without any loss of quality. Hence
there is no concept of "original copy" for electronic documents, as any copy
made is identical to, and is just as good as, the original.
Second, electronic documents are seamless. They can be altered easily
and without leaving a trace. If done carefully, any part of an electronic docu-
ment can be cut out and inserted into another electronic document without
the change being noticeable. The resulting documents will appear just as seam-
less as any other electronic document.
These two characteristics render the forging of electronic documents much
easier than that of paper documents. As there are generally no discernible
differences between a forged electronic document and a genuine electronic
document, anyone unfamiliar with the digital technology could be deceived.
Furthermore, because there is no concept of "original copy" for electronic
documents, methods for ascertaining the validity of signatures that rely on
the existence of original copies (such as those used for paper documents dis-
cussed earlier) cannot be applied to electronic documents.
To provide the necessary technological infrastructure for signing electronic
documents, one needs a mechanism for generating signatures on electronic
documents that comply with the three requirements, and a method that
18 "Bit" is short for binary digit, the smallest unit of information in the digital world. A bit can hold only
one of two values: 0 or 1. More meaningful information is represented in larger units obtained by
combining consecutive bits. For example, a byte is composed of eight consecutive bits, which is the
unit for representing an English alphabet or an Arabic numeral.
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enables anyone to determine the validity of those signatures. It is for these
purposes that digital signature technology has been devised. Although the
technology is now well known, it is instructive to review why it can fulfil
these purposes, in order to see why PIN technology cannot.
Digital Signatures
Central to digital signature technology is the notion of the "digital signature",
which is defined in the ETO as:
"an electronic signature of the signer generated by the transformation of
the electronic record using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a hash func-
tion such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic record
and the signer's public key can determine -
(a) whether the transformation was generated using the private key that
corresponds to the signer's public key; and
(b) whether the initial electronic record has been altered since the trans-
formation was generated."19
This rather technical definition reflects the process of generating digital
signatures for electronic documents. Briefly, the process consists of two steps:
1 A standard mathematical function known as a "hash function" is ap-
plied to the contents of the electronic document to produce a "hash
value". This hash value (a sequence of 160 bits if it is produced by the
standard SHA-1 hash function)20 represents a digest of the contents of
the document.
2 The hash value is encrypted (ie scrambled) by the signatory using his
unique private key. The value can only be decrypted (ie unscrambled)
by the corresponding public key."1 This encrypted hash value is the "digi-
tal signature" for the electronic document.
19 Section 2.
20 "SHA" stands for "Secure Hash Algorithm". Another standard hash function is MD5 ("MD" is short
for "Message Digest"), which produces hash values of 128 bits. For more information about these
standard hash functions, see Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography
(New York: CRC Press, 1997), Ch 9.
21 Private and public key pairs are generated based on the RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem invented by
three professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1977. The name RSA was derived
from the names of the three inventors, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. The RSA Public-Key
Cryptosystem is an "asymmetric cryptosystem" as it involves the use of key pairs and it is
computationally infeasible to deduce one key of a key pair from the other, ie a private key cannot be
deduced from the corresponding public key, and vice versa. For more details on the RSA Public-Key
Cryptosystem, see Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, "A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and
Public-Key Cryptosystems" (1978) 21 Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery
120. See also US Patent 4,405,829.
Vol 32 Part 2
HeinOnline -- 32 Hong Kong L.J. 249 2002
From both the legal and technological points of view, the two steps
above are significant. Because the hash value for a document is in effect a
fingerprint for the document,22 and any alteration to a document will re-
sult in a different hash value, the effect of step (1) is to freeze the contents
of the document at the time of creating the digital signature. By encrypt-
ing the hash value using the signatory's private key (a unique key known
only to the signatory and which is virtually impossible for anyone to de-
rive or guess) the effect of step (2) is to link uniquely the digital signature
to the signatory, ie the owner of the private key. As will be seen, these
two steps are crucial for generating signatures that comply with the three
requirements.
The above process for generating digital signatures also creates an im-
portant property in the digital signature which distinguishes it from
handwritten signatures. This property is often overlooked. While a hand-
written signature is an attribute of the signatory alone, the digital signature
is an attribute of a combination of the signatory's private key and the con-
tents of the electronic document. In other words, a handwritten signature
is only "signatory-specific", whereas the digital signature is both "signatory-
specific" and "document-specific". It follows that while one can expect
handwritten signatures of the same signatory on different documents to look sub-
stantially the same, one cannot expect this to be the case for digital signatures.
Indeed, the digital signatures for two different documents are always different,
even when they are produced by the same signatory using the same private
key. With the slightest change in the contents of an electronic document
(for instance, changing one occurrence of "e" to "i"), an entirely different
digital signature will ensue.
Compliance with the Three Requirements
The compliance of the digital signature with the three requirements and the
verification of such compliance is built into the process for sending and re-
ceiving digitally signed documents. In this process, the signatory sends a
digitally signed document to the recipient, who decides whether or not to
accept it based on the digital signature. This is done as follows.
After generating the digital signature for an electronic document, as de-
scribed earlier, the signatory sends the electronic document to the recipient
together with the following information:
22 The hash value for each document is almost certain to be unique. For example, if one uses the
standard SHA- 1 hash function, the probability of two different documents resulting in the same hash
value is one in 2160, ie less than one in one trillion trillion trillion trillion, or virtually nil.
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1 the digital signature; and
2 a digital certificate issued by a recognised certification authority (ie a
trusted third party)" which confirms the signatory's identity and which
contains the signatory's public key.
Upon receiving the digitally signed document, the recipient performs the
following steps to decide whether or not to accept the document.
First, the digital signature is decrypted using the signatory's public key
contained in the digital certificate. This recovers the original hash value en-
crypted by the signatory.
Second, the standard hash function used by the signatory, known to the
recipient, is applied to the contents of the document to recompute the hash
value. This value is compared with the original hash value recovered in the
first step. If the two hash values are the same, the document is accepted;
otherwise it is rejected.
While not immediately obvious, the steps performed by the recipient ac-
tually serve to ascertain whether the digital signature has met the three
requirements. What is crucial here is the criterion for accepting a digitally signed
document: namely, that the hash value recomputed by the recipient must be the
same as the original hash value recovered from the digital signature. If this crite-
rion is satisfied, it means that:
1 The document has not been altered since it was digitally signed. Other-
wise the recomputed hash value (based on the altered document) would
be different from the original hash value recovered from the digital sig-
nature (based on the document at the time it was digitally signed).
2 The digital signature was created by the unique private key correspond-
ing to the public key contained in the digital certificate attached to
the document. If this were not the case, the recipient would not have
been able to recover the original hash value from the digital signature
and to find that it matched the recomputed hash value.
Taken together, these two facts imply that the three requirements are met.
It is not difficult to see why.
First, fact (1) precisely means that the digital signature satisfies the
approval requirement.
Second, fact (2) means that the digital signature was created by, or with
the authority of, the owner of the private key, whose identity is confirmed by
23 In Hong Kong, the Postmaster General is a recognised certification authority by virtue of s 34 of the
ETO. At the time of writing, three more certification authorities have been recognised by the Direc-
tor of Information Technology Services: Digi-Sign Certification Services, Joint Electronic Teller
Services and HiTrust.com.
Vol 32 Part 2
HeinOnline -- 32 Hong Kong L.J. 251 2002
the digital certificate issued by a trusted third party. This satisfies the
authorisation requirement.
Third, because of the asymmetric nature of the public key cryptosystem,24
it is infeasible to derive the corresponding private key from a public key
computationally, let alone by a "blind guess".25 It follows that it is virtually
impossible that the private key could have been forged by anyone, including
those who know about the public key. Hence fact (2) also means that the no
fraud requirement is satisfied.
It is important to note that although electronic documents are seamless,
one cannot forge a digital signature by a "cut-and-paste" operation (ie taking
the signatory's digital signature from one document and pasting it onto another).
Such a signature would be rejected outright, as the original hash value recov-
ered therefrom would be based on another document and would therefore not
match the hash value recomputed from the document in question.
A close study of digital signature technology reveals the fundamental reason
why the digital signature can comply with the three requirements. It is because
the technology has built into it the following elements for compliance:26
1 with regard to the authorisation requirement, compliance is achieved
by the digital certificate accompanying the document, which provides
the information for confirming the signatory's identity;
2 with regard to the approval requirement, compliance is achieved by
computing the hash value for the electronic document, which serves
to freeze the contents of the document at the time of creating the digi-
tal signature; and
3 with regard to the no fraud requirement, compliance is achieved by the
inherent improbability of anyone deriving the signatory's private key
from the corresponding public key.
All of these elements are indispensable to the eligibility of a digital signa-
ture as a signature. If there is any element missing, a digital signature will not
be able to satisfy all of the three requirements.
24 See n 21 above.
25 In theory, one should be able to find the private key by using a "brute force" approach of trying each
and every possible value that may lead to deducing the private key. But the time required for this
would be astronomical. Using the current standard 1024-bit RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem as an
example, the brute force approach would have to perform a mathematical process known as
"factorisation" by trying all possible values within the range 0 to 2512, a total of roughly 10154 (ie 1
followed by 154 zeroes) possible values. Even if one had a machine which could try one billion
different values per second - more powerful than today's top-end desktop computers - it would
take more than 10137 (ie I followed by 137 zeroes) years to exhaust all possible values in order to
deduce the private key. This renders the approach practically infeasible. More sophisticated methods
would employ highly advanced mathematical techniques to reduce the time for deriving the private
key. But despite efforts in this regard, at the time of writing there is no reported case where the 1024-
bit RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem has been successfully compromised anywhere in the world.
26 See "Conditions for Compliance" under "Signatures on Paper Documents" above.
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In practice, digital signature technology has two disadvantages that need
to be overcome. First, because the technology requires a digital certificate
which has to be obtained from a recognised certification authority, it is not
entirely convenient to the end user.27 But overcoming this is essentially a
matter of making digital certificates cheaper and easier to obtain. As the market
sees more transactions conducted using digital signatures, there should be
more incentive for the public to adopt the technology. Second, as private
keys are almost impossible to memorise, they are invariably stored on com-
puters or other digital devices. As such, they are prone to security attacks. If a
private key falls into the wrong hands, the unique link between the key and
the key owner is immediately compromised. But this kind of risk is not unique
to the digital signature; it is in fact an inevitable and perennial risk that all
security technologies must face. For the digital signature, as with the pass-
word and PIN, the solution lies in adopting sound key management measures
and polices, at both the personal and corporate levels, which ensure the secu-
rity of private keys.
Personal Identification Number
Unlike the digital signature, the PIN does not involve the use of a key pair.
The concept of the PIN is akin to that of an identity card. The idea is that
each individual is given a unique PIN, and any person who is able to tender a
valid PIN is deemed to be the owner of that PIN (or at least have the author-
ity of the owner of the PIN). Thus, right from the beginning the PIN is designed
for authorisation. The main advantage of the PIN is ease of use, as it does not
require obtaining a digital certificate from a third party and using a private
key that is difficult to remember. Because of this, the PIN has long been used
for the purpose of authorisation in a variety of applications, most notably
banking transactions and computer logins.
Depending on the method used, a PIN may be checked by its recipient,
either in its original form or in hashed form (ie checking is performed on a
hash value generated for the PIN instead of the PIN itself, as is done in the
UNIX operating system in respect of passwords). In any event, the recipient
must maintain a database containing all the authorised PINs in either their
original or hashed form, together with information about their corresponding
owners. Upon receiving a PIN, the recipient will check to see if the PIN or its
27 This is one of the reasons why digital signatures have not been widely used in Hong Kong. In an
article published in May 2002, it was reported that Hongkong Post had issued about 50,000 personal
and corporate digital certificates, which was only one-tenth of what it expected when it launched its
service in early 2000: "New Certification Authorities Recognized", Computerworld Hong Kong, 10
May 2002, p 4.
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hash value is stored in the recipient's database. If it is, then the PIN is deemed
to be entered by the PIN owner.
Once a PIN owner has logged onto the recipient's system this way, she
does not need the PIN again to perform any action during the login session.
There is no requirement that the PIN must be contained in or attached to
any electronic document or message submitted by the PIN owner during the
login session. The PIN owner will only need to supply the PIN the next time
she starts a new login session. The recipient will, for accounting and security
reasons, keep a record of when a PIN owner logs in and when she logs out
(commonly known as a "session record"). In case of dispute, such records will
serve as evidence as to whether or not an act was performed by a particular
PIN owner at a particular time.
The way PINs work clearly shows that they are designed solely for the
purpose of authorisation and were never intended to play the role of signatures.
Indeed, PINs can only satisfy the authorisation requirement, not the other
requirements for a signature. A moment's thought reveals the reason why.
Since electronic documents submitted in a login session do not require a PIN,
there is nothing to prevent a dishonest recipient of a PIN from fabricating an
electronic document and creating a session record alleging that the docu-
ment was submitted by a PIN owner during that login session. To any outsider,
including the PIN owner, there is no easy way to discern such a fabricated
document and session record from genuine ones.
Furthermore, even if a PIN mechanism requires PIN owners to attach PINs
or their hash values to electronic documents submitted during a login session,
a dishonest recipient is still capable of practising the same fraud. This is be-
cause the attachment of a PIN to a document does not "freeze" the contents
of the document. As the recipient has a database containing all the PINs or
their hash values, he can extract any PIN or its hash value from the database
and attach it to a fabricated electronic document at any time if he so wishes.
Such fabricated documents are indistinguishable from genuine documents.
The ability of the recipient to forge electronic documents clearly violates
the no fraud requirement. In stark contrast, it is virtually impossible for the
recipient of a digitally signed document, and indeed anyone other than the
owner of the private key, to fabricate an electronic document alleging that it
was produced by the owner of the private key.
A closer examination of PIN technology reveals its inherent primitive-
ness and lock of security as compared to the digital signature:
1 the PIN does not involve the concept of an asymmetric key pair, whereas
the digital signature is built upon such a concept; and
2 the PIN is not attached to any document submitted by the PIN owner,
and even when it is it does not "freeze" the contents of any document
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it is attached to, whereas the digital signature always "freezes" the docu-
ment on which it appears.
It follows that the PIN cannot satisfy the approval requirement either.
Since an electronic document submitted in a login session is not required to
contain a PIN, the document can be altered without the change being detected.
In addition, even where a PIN is contained in such a document, the PIN does
not freeze the contents of the document. Hence the document can also be
altered without being detected.
Because the PIN does not satisfy all of the three requirements, it can never be
used as a fully-fledged signature. It can indicate authorisation, but not approval of
contents or absence of fraud. The fundamental characteristics of PINs are not
changed, however extensively they may have been used in market applications.
Unfortunately, this is precisely what the ITBB has failed to appreciate in the
Government's consultation paper. As a result, its argument in proposing that the
PIN be accepted as a form of electronic signature is fundamentally flawed.
The truth of the matter is that, owing to the inherent deficiencies of PINs,
any arrangement purporting to treat PINs as "signatures" will always place PIN
owners in a vulnerable position. A PIN owner can only trust that a recipient,
with the full capability to forge electronic documents and fabricate session
records, will act honestly and not betray her trust. This is the kind of trust that
bank customers who use PINs for banking transactions have always placed in
the banks. This is also the kind of trust that taxpayers have to place in the
Government if passwords are to be accepted as signatures for electronic tax
returns, as proposed in the Inland Revenue (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 2001,"
which is mentioned in the consultation paper.
Such trust in the recipient is fundamental to the use of PINs. It cannot
simply be imposed or assumed by legislation, but can only arise as a matter of
contract between the PIN owner and the recipient (as in the case between a
bank customer and the bank). In this regard, the ITBB's suggestion to use "a
secure system like the Electronic Service Delivery Scheme which provides strong
encryption services for data transmission"" is wholly irrelevant. Such secure
communication channels can only protect the PIN owner against eavesdroppers,
but not against the recipient. However secure a communication channel is, it
can never prevent a dishonest recipient from forging or altering electronic docu-
ments and alleging that such documents were submitted by the PIN owner.
28 Section 2(b) of the Bill proposes to add a new s 2(5) to the Inland Revenue Ordinance (Cap 112)
which reads: "In this Ordinance, a reference to the act of signing a return required to be furnished under
this Ordinance includes a reference to the adopting of - (a) a digital signature (supported by a recog-
nized certificate and generated within a period during which the certificate is valid); (b) a password; or
(c) any other signing device, for the purpose of authenticating or approving the return."
29 See n 4 above.
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It is in this respect that the digital signature shows its greatest strength,
namely, that its use does not depend on any trust in the recipient. On the
contrary, digital signature technology is designed precisely on the assumption
that the recipient is not to be trusted; the technology guarantees that it is
virtually impossible for the recipient of a digitally signed document to forge a
digital signature of an owner of a private key.
Conclusion
Whether a signature is handwritten or digital in form, it must satisfy three
basic requirements in order to give legal effect to documents that carry the
signature. These requirements can be termed the "authorisation requirement",
the "approval requirement" and the "no fraud requirement". They are consis-
tent with the signature requirements under the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
and the European Union Directive on electronic signatures.
In the paper-based world, there are well-established methods to ascertain
whether a signature has met these requirements. In the digital world, digital
signature technology has also built into it all the necessary elements for com-
pliance with the requirements. In contrast, PIN technology is designed solely
for the purpose of authorisation. As shown, despite its relatively long history
and ease of use as compared to the digital signature, PINs can only satisfy the
authorisation requirement, not the approval requirement or the no fraud
requirement. Because of these inherent deficiencies, PINs do not qualify as
fully-fledged lignatures. Hence, the ITBB's proposal that the ETO be amended
to accept PINs as satisfying the signature requirement thereunder is funda-
mentally flawed and should be firmly rejected.
Although there is no formal proposal yet, there are suggestions that "bio-
metrics" - the emerging field of technology devoted to the identification of
individuals based on their biological traits, for example retinal or iris
scanning, fingerprint recognition and face recognition - can be used for
signing electronic documents. Unlike PIN technology, which relies on ran-
domly generated sequences of numbers and / or letters to represent
individuals, biometrics is based on each individual's unique biological traits
that cannot be forged. Thus, biometrics is more closely connected to the
individual than PINs are, making it well-suited for direct identification of
individuals rather than just for ascertaining authorisation. However, like
PINs, the use of biological traits as a form of electronic signature also suffers
from two loopholes:
1 the attachment of biological traits to a document does not freeze the
contents of the document; and
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2 the recipient of documents thus signed must, for the purpose of verify-
ing the signatures, maintain a database containing the biological traits
of individuals in either their original form or some other form.
As explained in the context of the PIN, these two loopholes will also
render biometrics incapable of satisfying the approval requirement and the
no fraud requirement. Accordingly, unless these loopholes are closed, bio-
metrics alone cannot be used to sign electronic documents.
As technology stands, the digital signature based on PKI is the most se-
cure and practical solution for signing electronic documents. Experience in
other countries also shows that the digital signature is the technological foun-
dation for electronic commerce. The ETO, in giving legal recognition to the
digital signature, has provided the necessary legal infrastructure for electronic
commerce in Hong Kong. It may take some time for digital signature tech-
nology to mature and become widely used in the community. Even so, the
legal infrastructure for electronic commerce already established by the ETO
must not be undermined by extending legal recognition to forms of electronic
signatures that are less secure than digital signatures, let alone those that do
not even meet the basic requirements for a signature.
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